Direito da Concorrência e Plataformas Digitais (DCO5966)

Objetivos:
O objeto da disciplina será o estudo das principais controvérsias e desafios que envolvem a aplicação da política de defesa da concorrência às plataformas digitais.
A disciplina inicialmente estudará o ambiente tecnológico em que se inserem as plataformas digitais e as peculiaridades de sua dinâmica concorrencial, uma vez que em regra atuam em mercados de múltiplos lados, nos quais se observa a tendência à concentração de poder econômico, em decorrência de elevadas externalidades de rede, economias de escala e escopo e baixos custos marginais.
Haverá a discussão dos objetivos da política de defesa da concorrência, cuja reflexão e redimensionamento é especialmente relevante em relação às plataformas digitais.
A disciplina discutirá também as adaptações necessárias para que as peculiaridades das plataformas digitais sejam adequadamente levadas em consideração na delimitação do mercado relevante, o dimensionamento do poder de mercado, na aferição dos efeitos de condutas e concentrações econômicas e na concepção dos remédios antitruste.
Serão discutidas as críticas à inoperância do controle de concentração para prevenção do crescimento não orgânico de poder de mercado, com ênfase no estudo de casos e nas reformas necessárias para o seu aperfeiçoamento e efetividade, tanto no que diz respeito às modificações nos critérios de notificação de atos de concentração quanto na introdução de maior rigor na análise do impacto da fusão no mercado em que ela se insere.
Haverá, ainda, a análise de condutas anticoncorrenciais atribuídas a plataformas digitais, em especial abusos de posição dominante de natureza tanto exclusionária quanto exploratória, com o estudo dos principais casos analisados por autoridades de defesa da concorrência no Brasil e no exterior.

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